It has recently been shown that if feedback effects of decisions are ignored, then imposing fairness constraints such as demographic parity or equality of opportunity can actually exacerbate unfairness. We propose to address this challenge by modeling feedback effects as the dynamics of a Markov decision processes (MDPs). First, we define analogs of fairness properties that have been proposed for supervised learning. Second, we propose algorithms for learning fair decision-making policies for MDPs. We also explore extensions to reinforcement learning, where parts of the dynamical system are unknown and must be learned without violating fairness. Finally, we demonstrate the need to account for dynamical effects using simulations on a loan applicant MDP.
Introduction
Machine learning has the potential to substantially improve performance in legal and financial decision-making. However, it has been demonstrated that biases in the data can be reflected in a decision-making policy trained on that data (Dwork et al., 2012) , which can result in decisions that unfairly discriminate against minorities. For example, consider the problem of giving loans to applicants (Hardt et al., 2016) . If minorities are historically given loans less frequently, then there may be less data on how reliably they repay loans. Thus, a learned decision-making policy may unfairly label minorities as higher risk and deny them loans.
There have been several candidate definitions of fairness, including demographic parity (i.e., members of the majority and miniority subpopulations must on average have equal outcomes) (Calders et al., 2009 ), equality of opportunity (i.e., qualified members must on average have equal outcomes) (Hardt et al., 2016) , and causal fairness (i.e., protected attributes should not influence outcomes) (Kusner et al., 2017; Kilbertus et al., 2017; Nabi & Shpitser, 2018 The appropriate definition depends on the application.
So far, work on fairness has focused on supervised learning. However, it has recently been shown that naïvely imposing fairness constraints while ignoring even one-step feedback effects can actually harm minorities (Liu et al., 2018) . Thus, it is critical that we extend existing definitions of fairness to account for the feedback effects of the decisions being made on members of the population. For example, denying loans to individuals may have consequences on their financial security that need be taken into account. This paper proposes algorithms for learning fair decisionmaking policies that account for feedback effects of decisions. We model these effects as the dynamics of a Markov decision process (MDP), and extend existing fairness definitions to decision-making policies for a known MDP. Unlike supervised learning, we distinguish the quality of outcomes for the decision-maker (e.g., the bank) from the quality of the outcomes for individuals (e.g., a loan applicant). Then, fairness properties are constraints on the average quality of outcomes for individuals in different subpopulations (e.g., majorities and minorities are offered loans at the same frequency), whereas the reward measures the quality of outcomes for the decision-maker (e.g., the bank's profit).
The key challenge is that learning with a fairness constraint is much more challenging in the MDP setting due to the inherent non-convexity-indeed, constrained reinforcement learning is an active research area (Altman, 1999; Achiam et al., 2017; Wen & Topcu, 2018; Bastani et al., 2018) . Building on this work, we propose both model-based (Altman, 1999 ) and model-free (Wen & Topcu, 2018) algorithms for learning policies that satisfy fairness constraints. We initially assume the dynamics are known, but propose extensions to settings where parts of the dynamics are unknown.
Prior work has studied one-step feedback effects (Liu et al., 2018) , but do not propose fair learning algorithms. For learning unknown dynamics, prior work has focused on bandit settings with specific fairness constraints (Joseph et al., 2016; Hashimoto et al., 2018) . There has been work on learning unknown dynamics in MDPs (Jabbari et al., 2017; Elzayn et al., 2019) , but for a specific fairness contraint. Furthermore, for their constraint, the optimal policy is always fair. Thus, unlike our setting, solving for the optimal fair policy is trivial once the dynamics are known.
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Fairness with Dynamics
We compare to two baselines that ignore dynamics: (i) an algorithm that optimistically pretends that actions do not affect the state distribution (i.e., supervised learning), and (ii) an algorithm that conservatively assumes the state distribution can change adversarially on each step. In a simulation study on a loan applicant MDP based on (Hardt et al., 2016) , we show that compared to our algorithm, the optimistic algorithm learns unfair policies, and the conservative algorithm learns fair but poorly performing policies. Our results demonstrate the importance of accounting for dynamics. is the initial state distribution (i.e., D s is the probability of starting in state s), P ∈ R |S|×|A|×|S| are the transitions (i.e., P s,a,s is the probability of transitioning from state s to state s when taking action a), R ∈ R |S|×|A| are the rewards (i.e., R s,a is the reward obtained taking action a in state s), and γ ∈ R is the discount factor. Given a stochastic policy π ∈ R |S|×|A| (i.e., π s,a is the probability of taking action a in state s), the induced state transtion probabilities are P (π) ∈ R |S|×|S| , where
Problem Formulation
the induced distribution over states at time t is
otherwise, and the time-discounted overall distribution over states is
Then, the time-discounted overall distribution over stateaction pairs is Λ ∈ R |S|×|A| , where
and the expected cumulative reward is
where X, Y = s∈S a∈A X s,a Y s,a . Given a policy class Π, the optimal policy is π * = arg max π∈Π R (π) .
Example. We describe an MDP M loan that models individuals applying for loans. We assume each individual has a true probability p of repaying their loan. On step t, the bank has a prior on p (e.g., a credit score); for simplicity, we assume this prior is a Beta distribution-i.e., p t ∼ Beta(α t , β t ). Thus, the states of our MDP (α t , β t ).
1
The actions are to offer (a = 1) or deny (a = 0) a loan. If the bank offers a loan, the transitions are (α t+1 , β t+1 ) = (α t + 1, β t ) with probability p (α t , β t+1 ) with probability 1 − p.
If the bank denies the loan, then mathematically, the parameters of the posterior are (α t+1 , β t+1 ) = (α t , β t ). However, since we are interested in detrimental effects of the bank's decisions, we consider the possibility that this decision reduces the applicant's ability to pay for future loans:
for some τ ∈ R + -e.g., if a loan is denied, the applicant may resort to more expensive loans, thus reducing their wealth. We assume the initial state distribution is z ∼ Bernoulli(p Z ) and (α, β) ∼ p 0 (α, β | z) for some p Z ∈ [0, 1] and some distribution p 0 . The bank's rewards are
where P is the principal (without loss of generality, we let P = 1), I is interest, δ indicates whether the loan is repaid, and λ ∈ R + . The first term is expected profit, and the second term is to avoid risk. We assume that the bank makes decisions with the goal of maximizing (1).
The fairness constraint refers to the rewards for individuals, which we call agent rewards. In our example, the agent rewards are I[a = 1], where I is the indicator function-i.e., a positive outcome is when the individual is offered a loan.
Fairness. Consider a population of individuals (e.g., loan applicants) interacting with a decision-maker (e.g., a bank) (Hardt et al., 2016) . States S encode an individual's features (e.g., probability of repaying a loan), actions A are interventions (e.g., loan offer), and transitions P encode state changes (e.g., changes in ability to repay). We use rewards R to indicate quality of outcomes for the decision-maker (e.g., the bank's profit), and use agent rewards ρ ∈ R |S|×|A| to indicate quality of outcomes for an individual (e.g., whether a loan is offered).
Our goal is to learn the optimal policy for the decisionmaker under a fairness constraint. In particular, we want to ensure that π does not favor the majority subpopulation over the minority subpopulation. We assume the state space has the form S =S × Z, where Z = {maj, min} encodes whether an individual (s, z) ∈ S is from the majority (z = maj) or minority (z = min) subpopulation, andS encodes non-sensitive individual characteristics (e.g., probability of repaying a loan). We base our constraints on those for supervised learning (Hardt et al., 2016) . Definition 2.1. Let M be an MDP with state space of the form S = Z ×S, where Z = {maj, min}, and let ρ ∈ R |S|×|A| be the agent rewards. Then, a policy π satisfies demographic parity if
That is, Λ
z is Λ (π) conditioned on the initial state s 0 being of the form s 0 = (z,s 0 ) for somes 0 ∈S, and demographic parity says that the cumulative agent rewards are equal on average for the majority and minority subpopulations. For M loan , demographic parity says that loans should be given to majority and minority members with equal frequency.
Our goal is to compute the optimal policy for the policy class Π DP of policies that satisfy demographic parity:
Remark 2.2. We focus on demographic parity, but the techniques we develop are general. In particular, they apply to any fairness constraint saying that two subpopulations should have equal outcomes on average-i.e., for any set of subsets S z ⊆ S for each z ∈ Z, letting
then we can handle the fairness constraint
For example, our techniques also apply to equality of opportunity (Hardt et al., 2016) and path-specific causal fairness (Nabi & Shpitser, 2018) ; see Appendix A.
Remark 2.3. We sometimes consider a fairness with an tolerance (for some ∈ R + ):
We let Π DP, denote the policies satisfying (3).
Remark 2.4. We consider two subpopulations for simplicity; our techniques extend to multiple subpopulations.
Existence and determinism. We briefly discuss the existence of deterministic solutions to (2). Unconstrained MDPs always have a deterministic optimal policy (Sutton & Barto, 2018) . With a fairness constraint, this result no longer holds:
Theorem 2.5. There exists an MDP such that Π DP = ∅.
There exists an MDP such that π * in (2) is not deterministic.
We give a proof in Appendix B. For the following special case, we can prove existence of fair policies: Definition 2.6. The agent rewards are state-independent if ρ s,a =ρ a for all s ∈ S and for someρ ∈ R |A| .
Intuitively, this property captures settings where the decision-maker uses the state to choose actions (e.g., ability to repay), but the outcomes for the individuals only depend on whether the preferred action is taken (e.g., a loan offer). Our example M loan has state-independent agent rewards. Theorem 2.7. If the agent rewards are state-independent, then (2) has a solution.
Proof. Clearly, any policy π such that π s,a =π a for all s ∈ S and someπ ∈ R |A| , satisfies π ∈ Π DP .
Model-Based Algorithm
We describe a model-based algorithm for solving (2), which has strong theoretical guarantees (i.e., it solves (2) exactly in polynomial time). On the other hand, it makes strong assumptions-i.e., that M has finite state and action spaces, and furthermore satisfies a separability property saying that the sensitive attribute z ∈ Z does not change over time: Definition 3.1. An MDP with states S = Z ×S is separable if the transitions satisfy P (z,s),a,(z ,s ) = δ z,z Ps ,a,s , where δ z,z = I[z = z ] is the Kronecker delta and P ∈ R |S|×|A|×|S| is a transition matrix.
That is, the transitions do not affect z. This property is satisfied by many sensitive attributes (e.g., race and gender).
Background. When the policy class Π is unconstrained, then the optimal policy is deterministic, and can be expressed as the function
where the value function V * ∈ R |S| is the unique solution to the Bellman equation (Sutton & Barto, 2018 ):
Furthermore, V * is the solution to the following linear program (LP) (Sutton & Barto, 2018) : 
Algorithm. When we require that π ∈ Π DP , then the Bellman equation (4) may no longer hold. Thus, if we add this constraint to (5), then (5) may become unsatisfiable. Instead, our approach is based on the dual of (5) (Altman, 1999) . In particular, the objective and first set of constraints of the LP in Algorithm 1 form the dual.
2
The last set of constraints in the LP in Algorithm 1 encodes demographic parity. These constraints exploit the separable structure of the underlying MDP. In particular, the component z of an initial state s = (z,s) does not change over time, so the value of z for s equals the value of z for the initial state s 0 ∼ D. Thus, randomly sampling a state
is equivalent to randomly sampling
Expanding the conditional probability, the probability of
It follows that
The last set of constraints in the LP in Algorithm 1 uses (6) to encode demographic parity.
Theorem 3.2. Given a separable MDP M , Algorithm 1 a solution π * to (2) if and only if (2) is satisfiable.
We give a proof in Appendix C. Since we can solve an LP in polynomial time, Algorithm 1 runs in polynomial time.
2 Some variables are rescaled compared to the actual dual.
Model-Free Algorithm
Our model-based algorithm makes strong assumptions about the given MDP-i.e., separability and finite state and action spaces. We propose a model-free algorithm for solving (2) that relaxes all these assumptions. Our algorithm learns policies that satisfy demographic parity with an tolerancei.e., the set of policies Π DP, . We need this tolerance since our model-free algorithm can only estimate the agent rewards ρ. Then, our algorithm is based on formulating (2) as the following optimization problem:
where ρ
. Note that this optimization problem is non-convex. Thus, unlike our model-based algorithm, this algorithm may converge to a local optimum.
Background. Our algorithm relies on the cross-entropy (CE) method (Mannor et al., 2003; Hu et al., 2012) , which is a general heuristic for solving optimization problems. Suppose our policies π θ ∈ Π are parameterized by θ ∈ Θ, and let a family F of probability distributions over Θ parameterized by V ⊆ R d . In general, we use θ and π θ interchangeably, e.g.,
In the unconstrained setting, CE aims to solve the following optimization problem:
where we have used the notation E v = E θ∼fv . In other words, it aims to compute a distribution f v * that places high probability mass on θ with high expected cumulative reward R (θ) . Then, it returns a sample θ ∼ f v * .
To solve (8), CE starts with initial parameters v 0 ∈ V . Then, on each iteration, it updates the current parameters v k to move "closer" to v * . More precisely, the update is
where
Here, α, µ ∈ (0, 1) are hyperparameters. Intuitively, the first term of g i upweights θ with large values of R (θ ) compared to f v k , both by directly weighting the probability of θ by R (θ ) , and furthermore by placing zero probability mass on the bottom 1 − µ fraction of the θ . The second term of g k is a "smoothing" term that makes the update incremental.
To enable efficient optimization of (9), we assume that F is a (natural) exponential family.
In this case, it can be shown that (Hu et al., 2012) 
The CE algorithm approximates (10) by sampling rollouts
and where
To estimate η k+1 , it takes n samples θ
in decreasing order ofR
, and discards all but the top n = nµ . Now, it estimates the numerator in η k+1 as
The denominator in η k+1 is estimated similarly.
Algorithm 2 computes this estimate of the update (10) assuming the condition on Line 11 is satisfied (as we discuss below, the check is needed to enforce the constraint in (7)). Line 6 of Algorithm 2 computes the estimatesR
, and Line 14 estimates η k+1 .
On Line 6 & 7, the notation ∼m ←−− means to estimate using m samples (in this case, rollouts ζ (1) , ..., ζ (m) ).
Finally, we use a constrained cross-entropy (CCE) method, which extends CE to handle constraints (Wen & Topcu, 2018) . Intuitively, CCE prioritizes policies where the constraint in (7) is closer to holding, unless the constraint holds, in which case CCE prioritizes policies with higher expected cumulative reward. In particular, Algorithm 2 imposes this constraint by checking if a sufficient fraction of the θ satisfies the constraintˆ (θ) ≤ in Line 11, whereˆ (θ) is estimated from samples. As discussed below,˜ is used in place of to enforce the constraint even thoughˆ (θ) is inexact.
Algorithm. A key challenge to applying CCE is that it relies on estimatesˆ (π) of (π) . These estimates are inexact for two reasons: (i) they are estimated from samples, and (ii) they are estimated based on a finite time horizon (whereas Algorithm 2 Model-free algorithm.
5:
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end if
is defined for an infinite time horizon). To account for this error, we use (1 − σ) (where σ ∈ (0, 1)) in place of when checking the constraint on Line 11 of Algorithm 2.
We provide two guarantees for Algorithm 2. First, the errors in (i) estimating whether (π) ≤ and (ii) estiamting R (π)
can be made arbitrarily small by making m and T large. Theorem 4.2. Assume that R max be an upper bound on R (i.e., R ∞ = R max ) and on ρ. Let δ ∈ R + and σ ∈ (0, 1/2] be given, and suppose that
Then, for any π, with probability at least 1 − δ, we have
, and
z (for each z ∈ Z) must be estimated with independently sampled rollouts.
Second, we assume that Algorithm 2 solves the problem truncated to T steps exactly, and then consider how the solution compares to the untruncated problem (7). Theorem 4.3. Assume that R max is an upper bound on R (i.e., R ∞ = R max ) and on ρ. Let σ ∈ (0, 1/2] be given, and suppose that T is as in Theorem 4.2, and let
, andΠ DP,˜ is the set of π satisfying |ρ
* ∈ Π DP, , and
We give proofs for both theorems in Appendix D. Note that in Theorem 4.3, we have restricted (7) to guarantee fairness with tolerance (1 − σ) 2 instead of . This restriction is needed since Algorithm 2 must be conservative to ensure that the error due to the truncation error. This gap can be made arbitrarily small by taking σ sufficiently small.
Fairness Ignoring Dynamics
To demonstrate the importance of accounting for dynamics, we compare to two baseline algorithms that ignore dynamics when constraining fairness. More precisely, these algorithms solve an optimization problem of the form
where Π 0 DP does not take into account the MDP dynamicsi.e., Π 0 DP does not account for how actions affect the distribution of states D (π,t) at future time steps t > 0. We consider two algorithms, each using a different choice of Π 0 DP . The first algorithm optimistically pretends that actions do not affect the state distribution-i.e., D (π,t) does not change over time. This captures the supervised learning setting. Compared to our algorithm, this algorithm may learn a policy that is unfair but achieves higher reward.
The second algorithm conservatively assumes D (π,t) can change arbitrarily on each step. Like our algorithm, this one learns a fair policy, but it may achieve much lower reward.
Optimistic assumptions. We can optimistically assume that the state distribution does not change over time, i.e.,
Given this assumption, the time-discounted distribution over states equals D regardless of the policy π-i.e., D (π) = D for any π. Then, we can let π * be the solution to
where D z = D | ∃s ∈S . s 0 = (z,s). We can solve (12) using a straightforward modification of Algorithm 2.
Theorem 5.1. Assuming that (11) holds for the MDP M , then the solution of (12) is a solution to (2).
This theorem follows straightforwardly-in particular, the objective in (12) is the same as that in (2), and if (11) holds, then the constraint in (12) is equivalent to the demographic parity constraint. Of course, if (11) fails to hold, then we cannot provide any guarantees about π * .
Conservative assumptions. We can conservatively assume that D (π,t) for every t can be arbitrary, and to conservatively require that demographic parity holds for every possible sequence D (π,t) . We focus on finite S. Then, we restrict to policies π that satisfy
where D z = D | ∃s ∈S . s = (z,s), and ∆ n is the standard n-simplex. Note that D z is conditioned on s = (z,s) (i.e., the current state has sensitive attribute z) instead of s 0 = (z,s) (i.e., the initial state has sensitive attribute z); if M is separable, these two conditions are equivalent. Finally, note that D z is undefined if the conditional has zero probability according to D ; we implicitly omit such D from the universal quantification in (13).
The difficulty in enforcing (13) is handling the universal quantification over D ∈ ∆ |S| . In fact, we can equivalently enforce that the one-step rewards are independent of the state. Thus, we can solve the optimization problem arg max
We use π 0 to denote the solution to (14). When S is finite, we can solve (14) using a modification of Algorithm 2; however, to the best of our knowledge, the conservative approach is in general intractable when S is continuous. We have made conservative assumptions about D (π,t) , so the solution to (14) satisfies demographic parity.
Theorem 5.2. The solution π * of (14) satisfies π * ∈ Π DP .
We give a proof in Appendix E. Note that while the solution π * of (14) is guaranteed to satisfy demographic parity, it may be suboptimal compared to taking into account the dynamics in the fairness constraint.
For separable M , (14) is equivalent to the LP arg max
so we can return the policy π s,a = λ s,a / a ∈A λ s,a . The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Reinforcement Learning
We discuss extensions to the setting where parts of the MDP are initially unknown, and the goal is to ensure fairness while learning these quantities. The approaches we propose are naïve, leaving room for future work. We consider policies that satisfy demographic parity with an tolerancei.e., the set of policies Π DP, . Our proposed approaches rely on the policy π 0 defined in (14), which is learned using conservative assumptions about the MDP dynamics.
Unknown dynamics. We propose an approach to fairness when the transitions P are unknown. Our goal is to ensure that with high probability, fairness holds for all time including during learning. We consider the episodic case where the system is reset after a fixed number of steps T , and take γ = 1. That is, a finite sequence of interactions is performed repeatedly-e.g., each new loan applicant is a new episode. We assume there are a fixed total number of episodes N , and the goal is to perform well on average; the doubling trick can be used to generalize to unknown or unbounded N (see p. 99 of (Lattimore & Szepesvári) ).
We use explore-then-commit (Lattimore & Szepesvári) . First, we explore using the conservative policy π 0 for N 0 episodes. Then, we estimate P using the observed stateaction-state tuples (s, a, s ) (i.e., transition to s upon taking action a in state s):
P s,a,s = # observed tuples (s, a, s ) # observed tuples (s, a, s ) for some s ∈ S .
Finally, for the remaining N − N 0 , it uses the optimal policŷ π computed as ifP is the true transition matrix.
We assume that π 0 explores all state-action pairs. In particular, let
s π s,a , where D (π,t) is defined as before. Then, we assume that
for some constant λ 0 . We prove a bound on the regret
where the expectation is taken over the randomness of the observed tuples (s, a, s ), π * is the optimal policy for known P that satisfies π * ∈ Π DP, /4 , and
is the policy our algorithm uses on episode n. Furthermore, we show that for a given δ ∈ R + , we have π n ∈ Π DP, for every n ∈ [N ] with probability at least 1 − δ. Theorem 6.1. Let , δ ∈ R + be given. Assume that R max be an upper bound on R (i.e., R ∞ = R max ) and on ρ. Let
. LetM = (S, A, D,P , R, T ), andπ be the optimal policy forM inΠ DP, /2 (i.e., the set of policies satisfying demographic parity forM ). Let M = (S, A, D, P, R, T ), and π * be optimal for M in Π DP, /4 . Then,π ∈ Π DP, , and
We give a proof in Appendix G. Note that there is a gap between the fairness constraint of π * (which is in Π DP, /4 ) and that ofπ (which is only in Π DP, )-i.e., we can only guarantee performance compared to a policy that satisfies a stricter level of fairness. Choosing = N −2/3 , we have:
Corollary 6.2. For any δ ∈ R + , we have regret R(N ) = O(N 2/3 log(1/δ)) with probability at least 1 − δ.
Unknown initial distribution. Suppose that the initial distribution D is unknown. We consider the non-episodic setting-i.e., we cannot restart. In this setting, initially use the conservative policy π 0 , which is fair regardless of D. Then, we can improve performance once the Markov chain induced by π 0 is mixed-i.e., close to its stationary distribution (Kearns & Singh, 2002; Even-Dar et al., 2005) :
. Given ergodic π and ∈ R + , the mixing time is T ∈ N such that for all d ∈ ∆ |S| , (
Let T 0 be the 0 mixing time of π 0 . While D (π0,T0) is unknown, we know that it satisfies
Finally, we can run Algorithm 1 as if d (π0) is the initial distribution, to obtain a policyπ. As long as is sufficiently small, we can show thatπ achieves reward close to the true optimal policy π * (with initial distribution D (π0,T0) ).
Theorem 6.4. Let ∈ R + be given. Assume that R max upper bounds R (i.e., R ∞ = R max ) and ρ, and that the 0 mixing time of π 0 is T 0 , where 0 =
(π0) , P, R, γ), and letπ be the optimal policy forM inΠ DP, /2 (i.e., the set of policies satisfying demographic parity forM ). Similarly, let M = (S, A, D (π0,T0) , P, R, γ), and letπ * be the optimal policy for M in Π DP, /4 . Then, π ∈ Π DP, , and R
We give a proof in Appendix F. In other words, we act close to optimally once the Markov chain has mixed. However, Theorem 6.4 only bounds the reward compared to the optimal policyπ * on D (π0,T0) . Ideally, we would bound the reward compared to the optimal policy π * trained with known initial dynamics. However, even though we are acting optimally after the first T 0 steps, π 0 may have moved the system into a suboptimal distribution D (π0,T0) compared to D (π * ,T0) . Thus, we cannot prove such a bound.
Finally, as before, there is a gap between the fairness constraint of π * (in Π DP, /4 ) and that ofπ (only in Π DP, ).
Experiments
MDP parameters. We run simulations using our loan example from Section 2. We estimated parameters based on FICO score data (Hardt et al., 2016) . We consider the majority subpopulation to be Whites, and the minority subpopulation to be Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. For the initial distribution p 0 , we first fit parameters the parameters of the prior Beta(α z , β z ) based on the data. Then, we take a fixed number of steps T z using action a = 1 (i.e., offer loan) to force exploration. We choose T maj > T min to capture the idea that less data is available for minorities. We also estimate the probability p Z of being a minority from the data. Similar to (Hardt et al., 2016) , we choose I so the bank makes a profit on the average applicant. We manually choose the remaining parameters λ, τ , T maj , and T min based on intuition. We give exact parameter values in Appendix I.
Experimental setup. We ran Algorithm 2 to learn fair policies for both the demographic parity and equal opportunity constraints, using fairness threshold = 0.1 (i.e., policy classes Π DP, and Π EO, ). For each constraint, we also use the optimistic and conservative algorithms described in Section 5. Note that the conservative algorithms we described do not apply since our state space is infinite. However, since our agent rewards are state-independent, the conservative assumption is in fact equivalent to optimizing over stateindependent policies-i.e., those of the form π s,a =π a , whereπ ∈ R |A| . Thus, we can apply a modified version of Algorithm 2 where we only learn state-independent policies. We also run a race-blind algorithm, which is unconstrained but where π ignores the sensitive attribute z ∈ Z. Note that the optimal policy is race-blind, since the portion α, β of the state is a sufficient statistic, so it captures all information needed to determine whether to offer a loan.
Results. For demographic parity, Figure 1 (a) shows the reward achieved for the bank, and (b) shows the value of the fairness constraint-i.e., the smallest value of for which π ∈ Π DP, . As expected, race-blind achieves the highest reward (10.43), followed by the optimistic algorithm (10.41), and then Algorithm 2 (10.40). Finally, the conservative algorithm performs substantially worse than the others (10.00). However, race-blind achieves a very poor constraint value (0.42), as does the optimistic algorithm (0.14), which performs performs 43% worse than Algorithm 2 (0.10). The conservative algorithm achieves constraint value 0.
For equal opportunity, Figure 1 (c) shows the bank reward, and (d) shows the value of the constraint. The bank's rewards are essentially the same for the race-blind algorithm, optimistic algorithm, and Algorithm 2 (10.43), but is substantially worse for the conservative algorithm (10.00). As with demographic parity, the constraint value for race-blind (0.37) is substantially worse than the others, but in this case optimistic (0.11) is fairly close to Algorithm 2 (0.10). The conservative algorithm achieves constraint value 0.
Discussion. Our results show that imposing demographic parity slightly reduces the bank's reward, but substantially increases fairness compared to the race-blind and optimistic algorithms. Recall that the optimistic algorithm models supervised learning-thus, our results show the importance of accounting for dynamics when ensuring fairness. We find similar (but weaker) trends for equal opportunity. Like prior work (Hardt et al., 2016) , we find that demographic parity reduces the bank's rewards more than equal opportunity.
Unlike the static case (Hardt et al., 2016) , our model has dynamic parameters. Time series data would be needed to estimate these parameters; instead, we choose them manually. Also, (Hardt et al., 2016) uses the empirical CDF of the distribution over repayment probabilities p 0 (whereas we assumed p 0 is a Beta distribution). However, our goal is to understand the consequences of ignoring dynamics, not to study a real-world scenario.
A. Additional Fairness Properties
Equivalent of opportunity. The following fairness property is based on the equality of opportunity fairness property from (Hardt et al., 2016) for supervised learning.
Definition A.1. Let M be an MDP with state space of the form S = Z × Y ×S, where Z = {maj, min} and Y = {qual, unqual}, and let ρ ∈ R |S|×|A| be the agent rewards. Then, a policy π satisfies equality of opportunity if
This property is similar to demographic parity, but restricted to the qualified subpopulation-i.e., y = qual. For M loan , opportunity says that loans should be given to qualified majority and minority members at equal rates (we assume an applicant is qualified if their true probability of repaying satisfies p ≥ p 0 for some p 0 ∈ [0, 1]). In particular, the policy can act arbitrarily for unqualified members y = unqual.
Path-specific causal fairness. We describe a causal notion of fairness from (Nabi & Shpitser, 2018) , which we call path-specific causal fairness. We begin by giving background on causal graphs (Pearl, 2009 ). Our formulation differs from the one in (Nabi & Shpitser, 2018 ), but we believe it make the notion of mediated intervention more clear by isolating the source of randomness from the structural equations.
where each index i ∈ V is associated with a random variable i ∼ P i , which we call a noise term, with domain Z i . We use V = 1 ... n T ∼ P V to denote the vector of all noise terms, and Z V to denote the domain of V .
Intuitively, a causal domain V indexes the set of variables X 1 , ..., X k of interest. In particular, these variables are functions of the noise terms indexed by V .
Definition A.3. Given a causal domain V , a causal specification is a set of equations H = {h 1 , ..., h k }, where
Intuitively, a causal specification describes how to construct the variables X 1 , ..., X k given noise terms V , i.e., X i = h i ( V ) for each i ∈ V . Typically, causal specifications are constructed from structural equations associated with a causal graph:
Definition A.4. Given a causal domain V , a causal graph is a directed acyclic graph G = (V, E, F ), with vertices V , edges E ⊆ V × V , and structural equations
where pa(X i ) = {X j } (j,i)∈E are the parents of i; these equations have a unique solution since G is acyclic.
Intuitively, the vertices of a causal graph represent variables of interest, the edges represent dependence relationships between these variables, and the structural equations f i capture the causal dependences of X i on pa(X i ).
Given a causal graph G, we can modify the structural equations to specify changes in the causal structure of G. A key transformation is the following:
Definition A.5. Given causal graph G = (V, E, F ), index i ∈ V , and value x ∈ X i , the intervention specification is the causal specification H G,do(Xi=x) , where
We call i the intervened variable.
In other words, H
G,do(Xi=x) is computed replacing the previous value of X i with a constant. Definition A.6. Given causal graph G = (V, E, F ), indices i, i ∈ V , and values x, x ∈ X i , the mediated intervention specification is the causal specification H G,do(Xi=x),med(X i ;Xi=x ) , where
is the solution to
We call i the mediator variable.
This causal specification is essentially the same as H G,do(Xi=x) , except X i is modified to equal its value according to the intervention specification H G,do(Xi=x ) . Now, we have the following fairness specification for supervised learning (Nabi & Shpitser, 2018) :
and values x, x ∈ X i , a function φ :
We call X i the sensitive attribute (where x represents the majority subpopulation and x represents the minority subpopulation), X i the mediated attribute, and Y the outcome.
This specification captures the idea that the outcome should not change if we intervene on the sensitive attribute, except we ignore the effect of this intervention on the mediated attribute. For example, when a bank is deciding whether to give a loan, it should not discriminate against an individual based on their race (the sensitive attribute). However, they are allowed to base their decisions on attributes such as income (the mediated attribute), even if income is affected by race. Even if their income is lower because of past discrimination (e.g., they were unfairly denied a job in the past due to their race), this specification says it is not the responsibility of the bank to adjust for this discrepancy.
We have the following extension to the dynamical setting:
Definition A.8. Let M be an with states S = Z × Y ×S, and a causal graph G with vertices V = {Z, Y,S}. Then, a policy π : S → A satisfies path-specific causal fairness if
where Λ (π) maj is Λ (π) conditioned on starting from initial state
and Λ (π) min is Λ (π) conditioned on starting from initial state
Unlike unlike demographic parity and equailty of opportunity, Λ (π) maj and Λ (π) min are asymmetric. We can impose symmetry between the two subpopulations by imposing a second constraint with maj and min swapped.
Finally, we can straightforwardly adapt both our modelbased and model-free reinforcement learning algorithms to work with path-specific causal fairness, since it only affects the initial state distribution. As with demographic parity and equal opportunity, the model-based algorithm requires separability to hold.
B. Proof of Theorem 2.5
For the first claim, consider the MDP M . The states are s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 ∈S × Z, where:
The actions are A = {0, 1}. The transitions are P s0,a,s1 = 1
The discount factor is γ = for all a ∈ A. Let π : S → A be a deterministic policy. It is clear that the only value of π that matters is π(s 2 ). Conditioned on z = maj, regardless of π, the expected cumulative agent reward is
Conditioned on z = min, if π(s 2 ) = 0, then
Therefore, it is impossible for the demographic parity constraint to be satisfied.
However, consider the stochastic policy
Then,
so this policy satisfies the demographic parity constraint.
For the second claim, consider the same MDP, except where
for all a ∈ A. Then, it is clear that
regardless of π. Thus, the demographic parity constraint cannot be satisfied-i.e., Π DP = 0.
C. Proof of Theorem 3.2
Our proof proceeds in three steps. First, we show that any feasible point of the LP in Algorithm 1 is the state-action distribution Λ (π) for some policy π ∈ Π DP . Second, we show that conversely, for any fair policy π ∈ Π DP , the stateaction distribution Λ (π) is a feasible point of the LP. Finally, we combine these two results to prove the theorem.
Step 1. Let π ∈ Π DP be any policy satisfying demographic parity. Then, we claim that the state-action distribution Λ To this end, note that by induction,
Multiplying each side of (16) by I − γP (π) (where I is the |S| × |S| identity matrix), we have
Note that these algebraic manipulations are valid since the eigenvalues of γP (π) are bounded in norm by γ < 1, so all sums converge absolutely. Rearranging this equality gives
s,a P s,a,s for each s ∈ S, where we have used the equalities
that follow from the definition of Λ (π) . Therefore, Λ
satisfies the first constraint.
Next, we show that Λ (π) satisfies the second constraint, which says that there exists c ∈ R + such that
In particular, note that
since the value of z for s equals the value of z for the initial state s 0 ∼ D. Furthermore, the probability of sampling
Together with the definition of Λ
Therefore, we have
s,a ρ s,a .
By assumption, π satisfies the demographic parity constraint, which says that (18) is constant for all z ∈ Z. Equivalently, there exists c ∈ R + such that (18) equals c for all z ∈ Z. Thus, Λ (π) satisfies the second constraint.
Therefore, Λ (π) is a feasible point of the LP, as claimed.
Step 2. Let λ ∈ R |S|×|A| be a feasible point of the LP in Algorithm 1, and let
be the corresponding policy returned by Algorithm 1. Then, we claim that λ = Λ (π) , that π ∈ Π DP , and that the value of the objective for λ equals R (π) .
To see the first claim, let d ∈ R |S| be defined by
We show that D (π) = d. To this end, note that because λ satisfies the first constraint in the LP, we have
Together with the equality
we have
Thus,
We note that I − γP (π) is invertible-in particular, the eigenvalues of γP (π) have norms bounded by γ, so the eigenvalues of I − γP (π) have norms bounded below by 1 − γ; therefore, the eigenvalues of I − γP (π) are nonzero, so it is invertible. As a consequence, we can solve for d in (19) to get
Finally, from (17) in Step 1 of this proof, we established that D (π) similarly satisfies
As before, since I − γP (π) is invertible, we have
s,a , so the first claim follows.
To see the second claim, note that since λ is feasible, it must satisfy the second constraint of the LP, which says that there exists c ∈ R + such that
for all z ∈ Z. Since λ = Λ (π) , the same holds true for Λ (π) , i.e., there exists c ∈ R + such that
for all z ∈ Z. As shown in the first step of this proof, (20) is equivalent to the demographic parity constraint. Thus, π ∈ Π DP , as claimed.
To see the third claim, note that
In other words, the value of the objective of the LP for the point λ is equal to R (π) , as claimed.
Step 3. Finally, we use the results from the previous two steps to prove the theorem statement. First, let π * be the solution to (2). Then, by the claim shown in the first step, Λ (π * ) is a feasible point of the LP in Algorithm 1. Furthermore, by the claim shown in the second step, the value of the objective for λ = Λ
Next, let λ 0 be the solution to the LP in Algorithm 1. By the claim shown in the second step, (i) λ 0 = Λ (π0) , where π 0 is the policy returned by Algorithm 1, (ii) π 0 ∈ Π DP , and (iii) the value of the objective for λ 0 is R (π0) .
It follows that R (π * ) ≤ R (π0) , since π 0 maximizes the objective of the LP over feasible points (and Λ (π * ) is feasible).
Since π 0 ∈ Π DP , it follows that π 0 is also a solution to (2). Thus, we have proven the theorem statement.
D. Proof of Theorem1 4.2 & 4.3
Our proof proceeds in four steps. First, we bound the error |R (π) − R (π) | due to truncation. Second, we use Step 1 to prove Theorem 4.2. Third, we bound the estimation error |R (π) −R (π) |. Fourth, we combine steps 1 and 3 to prove Theorem 4.3.
Step 1. Note that for any policy π, we have
Similarly, we have
for all z ∈ Z.
Step 2. Now, we can prove Theorem 4.3. First, note that
* ∈ Π DP, , so the first claim. Similarly, is constant for all s ∈ S. In other words, there exists c ∈ R + such that a∈A π s,a ρ s,a = c for all s ∈ S. This statement is equivalent to the constraint in (14), so (13) implies the constraint in (14).
Thus, (13) and the constraint in (14) are equivalent, so the claim follows.
Step 2. We claim that if (13) holds for a policy π, then π ∈ Π DP . To this end, recall that the demographic parity constraint is E (s,a)∼Λ F. Proof of Theorem 6.4
Our proof proceeds in two steps. First, we prove that for any policy π, given two initial distributions D andD satisfying
where R (π) (resp.,R (π) ) is the expected cumulative distribution assuming the initial distribution is D (resp.,D), and similarly for the agent rewards ρ. Second, we use this fact to prove the theorem statement.
Step 1. We claim that assuming Taking a union bound over s ∈ S and a ∈ A, we have (27) holds for every s ∈ S and a ∈ A with probability at least
In this event, we have at least observations (s, a, s ) (for some s ∈ S) for every s ∈ S and a ∈ A. Now, for an observation (s, a, s ), let J s,a,s be the random variable indication whether s = s . Without loss of generality, we assume that we have exactly N 1 = N0λ0 2 samples J s,a,s ,j of J s,a,s for each s ∈ S and a ∈ A. Let 
Note that by definition, µ 
Fairness with Dynamics
Taking a union bound over all s, s ∈ S and a ∈ A, we have (30) for all s, s ∈ S and a ∈ A with probability at least
In other words, in this event, we have P −P ∞ ≤ 0 .
Taking a union bound over (28) and (31) Step 2. We claim that assuming
